The Difference: Dallas Mavericks 98, Los Angeles Lakers 92

Posted by Rob Mahoney on May 7, 2011 under Recaps | View Comments

Box Score — Play-by-Play — Shot Chart — GameFlow

You know the drill. The Difference is a reflection on the game that was, with one bullet for every point in the final margin.

• I did not even remotely anticipate having to tell Mavs fans to take deep breaths for all of the best reasons after the first three games in this series, but here we are. Inhale. Exhale. Never underestimate the heart of a chicken before it hatches in the cart before the horse, and all that. Dallas is in a great, great place — a greater place than one could possibly have imagined coming into this series — but just for the sake of finality, let’s see what happens in the remainder of this series before we start looking forward to who the Mavs may potentially meet in later rounds. Celebrate the first three wins and praise the Mavs for this incredible accomplishment, but be patient and be mindful of the opponent at hand. Dallas has certainly been the better team in this series, but L.A. isn’t quite finished yet.
• It’s adorable to watch the entire country appreciate Dirk Nowitzki (32 points, 12-19 FG, 4-5 3FG, nine rebounds) as if he were a great novelty rather than an established wonder. Yes, he’s that good. Yes, pretty much all the time. It’s terrific that Dirk’s public narrative is being rewritten with every big shot and every heady play, but really, it never should have come to that. The degree of diametric star-praising and star-targeting that goes on by NBA analysts is absurd. There is room for shades of gray; every Maverick loss isn’t an indictment of Nowitzki’s heart or toughness or ability, just as every win isn’t necessarily an affirmation (though due to just how fantastic Dirk is, this is largely the case). There’s plenty more nuance to the game than the goings on in the superstar strata, and while I’d be the first to tell you that Nowitzki is a truly phenomenal player, I’d also be the first to remind that playoff success is inherently a team accomplishment. We use rings and playoff wins to gauge the careers of individual players against each other, but the Mavericks’ shortcomings over the years have not been part and parcel to Dirk’s. He’s had some bad games now and again. Perhaps he struggled in this series or that. Yet overall, Nowitzki is one of the top playoff performers of the modern era and of all time, and while I’m happy to see the narrative turn, the root of the problem that bizarrely diminished the postseason repute of one of the game’s top performers still exists. Think for yourselves and evaluate for yourselves — stories from the ether are great, but the best antidote for over-the-top narrative exaggeration is our own capacity to reason.
• From ESPN Stats and Information: “Dirk Nowitzki finished with 32 points on 12-for-19 shooting from the floor as he notched his 10th straight playoff game with 20 or more points. Nowitzki feasted on Pau Gasol offensively as 27 of his 32 points came while being guarded by Gasol. This is not a huge surprise as Nowitzki is 19-of-25 from the floor for 45 points against Gasol this series.” On the flip side, Nowitzki has done a tremendous job of defending Gasol in this series. Dirk held a clear matchup advantage, but I had assumed there would naturally be a little more give to balance Dirk’s take. Hasn’t been the case so far, and as much as we can blame Gasol’s complacency on offense and whatnot, Nowitzki has been there, denying post position, battling on the back-down, challenging everything, and finishing the play with a box out.
• L.A. benefited from a great performance by Andrew Bynum, a more efficient night from Kobe, and Lamar Odom’s best showing in the series thus far — and still lost by a 7.3 efficiency differential. The Laker offense performed well — perhaps even well enough to win — but no one in this series can even attempt to guard Dirk Nowitzki effectively, nor defend the Mavs on the whole. Dallas has executed relentlessly on offense in this series. All of the blown pick-and-roll coverage, the inability to cover the corner man after a swing pass, the confusion in rotation? That’s all coming because the Mavs are pressing precisely the right buttons to make the Laker defense squirm. Dallas has the personnel and the ball movement necessary to really create problems for L.A.’s D, independent of the Lakers’ effort or execution. Dallas’ offense is just rolling right now because the ball-handlers continue to make smart decisions and those moving off the ball are cutting hard. The Lakers are a step behind, rotating late and getting stuck in coverage, and frankly incapable of keeping up with the extra pass at this point. That final swing, kick-out, or dump-down is what has broken the Lakers’ backs in this series, and it should offer Rick Carlisle such sweet relief to see his team working and working and working through every possession while the opponents share looks of exasperation.
• Peja Stojakovic (15 points, 5-11 FG, 3-7 3FG) is everything the Mavs had hoped he would be, and while his outside shooting was great, his defense was just as important. Stojakovic refused to be exploited; whether guarding Kobe off the dribble or Odom in the post, he did a terrific job of challenging shots to the best of his ability. Had Peja’s defense not held, today could look very different for both teams; Shawn Marion (two points, 1-7 FG, eight rebounds) wasn’t exactly on the top of his game, and Stojakovic was able to act as a key cog in Dallas’ perimeter attack because his defense allowed him to stay on the floor. Peja nailed so many big shots in this game, but he was only able to because of the big stops he earned on the other.
• As of right now, Jason Terry is averaging a 21.0 PER for this year’s playoffs, the highest mark of his career. He’s dropping 16.8 points per game (with the sandbagging pace of the Portland series keeping the numbers reasonable) on 49.1 percent shooting. He’s posting his highest playoff true shooting percentage since 2005. It’s not quite right to say that this is the Jason Terry of old, because honestly, this version is better. As fantastic as it is to see JET’s jumper falling again, what has impressed me even more (in both this series and the previous one) has been Terry’s unwillingness to settle. He’s driving to the hoop more often and more effectively than he has at any point during his career, and it’s those baseline drives and runners in the paint that have taken his efficiency to new heights…along with the fact that, yeah, he’s just hitting more shots more often. Bravo on both counts, JET.

Prioritization, Allocation, and Other Industry Buzzwords

Posted by Rob Mahoney on May 6, 2011 under Commentary | View Comments

2MG reader Tyler Copple dropped me an email with an interesting not on Pau Gasol’s performance in this series that is certainly worth passing along:

I recognize this is the layman “box score” which doesn’t show everything available, but even the advanced box score metrics are generally just aggregates of the basic stats.  [Gasol's] TS% is down ~7% because he’s taking three fewer shots, of which he generally makes 2.  That explains the dip in his points contributed number and his dip in PC/PU (points contributed/possessions used).

His rebounds are up marginally and his TRB% is up 2%, he’s getting to the line more, and he has more assists.

The only divergence in his shot chart is:

3-9 ft (reg): 1.7 FGM - 4 FGA
3-9 ft (semis): 1 FGM - 1.5 FGA

So the three fewer shots per game are being sacrificed in the 3-9 foot range.

If Pau was scoring 4 more points per game would he still be receiving as much blame as he is?  His numbers would be near identical to his season averages if he was.

Summit Push

Posted by Ian Levy on under Commentary | View Comments

Ian Levy is the author of Hickory High, a contributor to Indy Cornrows, and a part of The Two Man Game family. He’ll be bringing his intelligent brand of — mostly quantitative — analysis here on a weekly basis. You can follow Ian on Twitter at @HickoryHigh.

The story of the Mavericks-Lakers series has already undergone a significant rewrite. In Game 1, the Mavericks applied white-out with surgical precision, erasing a seven-point deficit in the fourth quarter to steal a win. They continued their editing in Game 2 using broad strokes of liquid-paper, and erased presumed Laker advantages in propelling themselves to a convincing 12-point win on the road. Both teams will be looking to retake control of the narrative in Game 3 tonight. Even with the next two games being played in Dallas, one would be a fool to not anticipate a tightening of the series. The series should be expected to be closer the rest of the way…but that’s not necessarily a bad thing for Dallas.

The Mavericks were 18-9 this season in games decided by five points or less. We’ve looked at their performance in the clutch this season at least once before; they were simply one of the best in the league at making the plays needed to pull out a win in hard fought contests. Obviously the Mavs would prefer not to play the Lakers down to the wire, but have to feel confident about their ability to win in such situations should they arise.

The Lakers are in a slightly different situation. Their performance in crunch time has been a persistent topic of discussion this season, specifically due to L.A.’s reliance on Kobe Bryant. Observation and precedent tell us he’s a crunch time all-star and one of the best closers the game has ever seen. Statistics tell a slightly different story. Kobe scores a lot in crunch time situations, but not very efficiently. He averages more assists, but only because he uses more possessions. Relative to shot attempts and turnovers, Kobe isn’t any more likely to share the ball at the end of the game as he is at any other point.

Los Angeles has just two players who have been very efficient in clutch situations this season, and neither is Kobe Bryant. Lamar Odom shot 61.5% in the clutch, Pau Gasol 46.3%. Luckily for the Mavericks, those two players averaged a combined 26.7 FGA/48 in the clutch, while Kobe alone shot 40.2% and averaged 38.8 FGA/48. When you factor in a combined 22.2 FGA/48 in the clutch for Ron Artest and Derek Fisher — who shot 30.8% and 31.3% respectively in such situations — the Mavericks have to feel pretty confident about their ability to outscore the Lakers in late-game scenarios.

I’m sure many of you are sick of this the ongoing debate over Kobe’s clutch performance, but my apologies — I’m not quite done with it. I’m certainly not the first to point this out, but shot selection is a huge factor in his inefficiency. The table below shows the percentage of Kobe’s shots which have come from each location over the past five seasons.

Kobe is taking roughly the same percentage of his shots from inside of 10 feet. The difference is that a much smaller percentage of them are coming right at the rim; Bryant is more and more reliant on his jumpshooting, which makes him much easier to defend effectively late in games. What makes Kobe so theoretically dangerous is the sheer number of ways that he can punish defenders, but 48,235 career minutes played over 14 seasons have taken some of those options away.

In late-game situations, Kobe’s shot distribution becomes even more rigid. This second table shows his shot breakdown in clutch situations for this regular season, and the small sample from this year’s playoffs:

He’s certainly confident in his ability to win games with mid-range jumpers. Still, that patter of decision making has made the job of the defense that much easier. Many have credited Bryant’s supreme confidence as the key to his perceived success in the clutch, but oddly enough, the only way for Bryant to break a cycle of inefficiency is to relinquish his ultimate alpha status. Does anyone think that’s a realistic possibility right now? It may be in the future, but I have to imagine it would take significant failure to prepare him for that mental transition.

Despite Kobe’s relative inefficiency in clutch situations, the formula has continued to work for the Lakers, a fact no APBRmetrician can argue with. But it won’t work forever. With the inevitable age-related decline of his athletic abilities, there’s not much Kobe can do to change his shot distribution and maintain a semblance of efficiency. We know where Kobe’s story is going because frankly, the nature of aging doesn’t allow for it to unfold any other way. Bryant’s ability to push the Lakers to victory with contested crunch time jumpers can’t persist forever, and though the critical turning point in L.A.’s late-game performance may still be a ways off, it feels closer than ever.

All It Took

Posted by Rob Mahoney on May 4, 2011 under Commentary | View Comments

I remain utterly convinced that no single factor — not Dirk Nowitzki in all of his clutch glory, not Jason Terry’s offensive contributions, not Corey Brewer’s stint as a difference-maker, or any other — made more of a profound impact on the result of Game 1 than the defensive play of Tyson Chandler and Brendan Haywood.

Chandler’s negation of Andrew Bynum was a tremendous accomplishment in itself. After all, rebuking a potential double-double does a lot for Dallas’ bottom line, and the efficiency with which Bynum typically operates would have tipped the scales considerably in L.A.’s favor. But more important than any direct impact that Chandler (and Haywood, to give credit where credit’s due) could provide was a subtle nudge.

The Lakers are never lacking in ability. They have production on all fronts, a fully functional defense, leadership, strong coaching, bench production, size, length, the whole shebang. L.A. very much has it all, and their two straight titles did not come by coincidence. Yet along with their considerable ability comes a bit of pride and a bit of laziness, and though it’s difficult for opposing teams to harness those weaknesses against the Lakers on a whim, it’s more than a bit helpful when L.A. does manage to turn against itself. It’s hard to say that the Lakers were their own worst enemy or somesuch in Game 1, but at times, they certainly worked to their own disadvantage. Once Chandler managed to defend Bynum successfully in the post and Gasol floated outward a bit, the Laker guards didn’t make the continued effort to establish an offensive rhythm through the two true conduits of the triangle. Having a post-centered offense requires much more diligence than most understand, and Game 1 was a perfect example of what can happen when a fully capable team shifts away from its very design.

L.A. still competed. They nearly won, too, because frankly, they have the talent to do so. Kobe Bryant played some sensational basketball, and connected on jumper after jumper with Maverick defenders in his face. He also showcased his abilities as a short-term fix when the Lakers needed a long-term solution; Bryant can keep the offense afloat all on his own, but without Bynum and Gasol attacking the interior, drawing fouls, and luring double teams, the Lakers are imminently beatable. Sometimes all it takes is the slightest nudge — a few stops or a few turnovers — to force Bryant and his teammates into a misread. Kobe becomes a bit too focal in the Laker offense, the player movement begins to stagnate, and the activity on the offensive glass comes to a halt. It’s as much Bryant’s fault as it is any other Laker’s, but L.A.’s occasional stagnation is a real, recurring problem. In Game 1, that problem was triggered by Tyson Chandler’s defense.

The Lakers will return tonight with attempts to run their offense as usual, and things will almost certainly be different than they were in Game 1. Still, L.A. remains vulnerable to the very same nudge. Perhaps Chandler can repeat his performance and lock down the low post. Maybe the Mavs will continue to release off of Ron Artest at times, and attempt to disrupt the Laker offense through him. Maybe Shawn Marion can force Bryant into not only missing, but taking tough shots that throw the Lakers out of their desired rhythm.

Then again, perhaps even with a successful push from the triangle, Kobe will bounce back to drop 40 and completely demolish everything that the Mavs could even hope to accomplish. All remain possibilities, but none should change the priority of testing the Lakers’ patience.

The Difference: Dallas Mavericks 96, Los Angeles Lakers 94

Posted by Rob Mahoney on May 3, 2011 under Recaps | View Comments

Box Score — Play-by-Play — Shot Chart — GameFlow

You know the drill. The Difference is a reflection on the game that was, with one bullet for every point in the final margin.

• The lines that separate outcomes — and naturally, the perception, reaction, and emotion that accompany them — are so very, very thin. It’s appropriate to say that Dallas “stole” or “escaped with” Game 1. There was so much potential for success and failure in that 48 minutes; the bounce of a ball and the sound of a whistle swayed the very existence of two entire basketball teams, two entire franchises, two entire fan bases. It’s after games like these that we’re compelled to look at singular plays to determine where things went right and where they went wrong, but the slim margin of victory gives even more of a reason than ever to look for that which brought sustained success. Don’t over-analyze Dirk Nowitzki’s drawn foul to give Dallas their go-ahead points, but the way he maneuvered in space throughout the game to create passing lanes and shooting angles. Don’t get too excited about Jason Kidd’s defensive disruption in the clutch, but embrace the strong interior defense that somehow made Andrew Bynum a non-factor. The Mavs didn’t win Game 1 because they hit big shots or made big stops. They won because of consistent execution. They won because of patience. They won because even when the passes were errant and the shots were drawing iron, they continued to run their sets and cut hard and work toward quality shots. They won because Kobe Bryant, while brilliant, attempted 29 shots without attempting a single layup or dunk. Every play matters, but strings of plays simply matter more. Those trends in play that matter more than any single element of the game ever could, even though the inherent anxiety of an endgame situation lends it a bloated importance.
• It’s safe to say that neither team has played its best game, but the Mavs developed an incredible offensive rhythm. The overall ball movement was spectacular; ball-handlers were only bottled late into the shot clock on a few occasions, and the otherwise crisp passing got the ball into the hands of a well-positioned scorer. The stagnation that leads to a completely Dirk-reliant offense was nowhere to be found, and while Nowitzki’s 28 points provided the foundation for Dallas’ offensive success, the Mavs’ flow didn’t rely on him to create every time down the floor. The Lakers had defensive breakdowns, but credit the Mavs for instigating them; those kinds of flaws are only evident if the offensive team creates situations to exploit them, and Dallas’ passing forced L.A. to adjust in ways that — on this night, anyway — they simply weren’t able. That the Mavs shot .450 from beyond the arc against one of the best three-point percentage defenses in the league isn’t indicative of some aberration, merely the fact that the Mavs worked to create open shot attempts and made an effort to establish their three-point shooters. The Lakers didn’t cover well, and nearly got away with it. Stay frosty. Dirk Nowitzki was unguardable, Tyson Chandler and Brendan Haywood played fantastic defense in the post, Shawn Marion and Jason Terry were engaged offensively, Corey Brewer played meaningful minutes, Jason Kidd made the right plays — and the Mavs won by a single bucket. A lot went right for Dallas in Game 1, which makes me curious to see how they function in the coming games when things aren’t going so smoothly. The Mavs weathered runs on Monday night, but I’m interested in seeing how they weather entire games; the micro-level in-game adjustments are fascinating, but only inevitable loss will bring an accurate measure of this team’s constitution and adaptability.

Of Mice and Pens

Posted by Rob Mahoney on May 2, 2011 under Commentary, News | View Comments

The 2007 Mavericks were dead: to begin with. There is no doubt whatever about that.

Yet now that those Mavs aren’t the only top-seeded team downed improbably by their eighth-seeded opponents in a seven-game series, the retrospective view of Dallas’ failure should be a bit different. Only it isn’t — the San Antonio Spurs, upon their premature dismissal from the postseason, have largely been met with knowing nods and tips of hats.  That’s not an inappropriate response given the franchise in question, but it’s certainly a startlingly different response than the one the Mavericks faced in ‘07.

In both cases, superior teams were defeated due to the pesky complications of specific matchup problems. Lost amidst all the “better team won” cliché of the San Antonio-Memphis series is the fact that the Spurs lost the series despite their objective superiority. According to Basketball-Reference.com’s series preview, the four most probable results of the series — based on the regular season exploits of both teams — were as follows:

• Spurs in 5 (25.4%)
• Spurs in 7 (19.7%)
• Spurs in 6 (13.3%)
• Spurs in 4 (12.9%)

Granted, the series projections based on the post-deadline data alone paint a different picture. But if we view San Antonio’s 82-game season as their total body of work, there was no reason to expect that they might lose in the first round. A 75.7% chance of taking the series is a fairly dominant mark, and yet one that made sense considering the statistical profiles of both clubs. All signs pointed to the Spurs being the better team, just as they pointed to the Mavs being the better team in 2007. The two teams are more kindred in spirit than the response to this latest upset would suggest. The decidedly rosier reaction to the Spurs’ first round flub a bit confusing, to be honest.

San Antonio didn’t lose to a better team, merely one that — when playing within the context of this particular series – looked like the better team. Yet their first round demise has inspired more mourning than mocking, more admiring lament than schadenfreude. Again, these responses are not inappropriate so much as incongruent; I have no qualms with the respectful reaction to the fall of San Antonio in itself, merely with the fact that another damn impressive franchise wasn’t given the same benefit back in 2007.

The Spurs and the Mavs are, sadly, two franchises defined by their echoes. It doesn’t have to be that way, but sports fans make it so with every time they mock the ringless or fetishize the exploits of a former champion. San Antonio has won four titles in the Tim Duncan era, and as such, is generally considered immune to all criticism. They’ve somehow achieved the ends that justify all means and erase all flaws — past, present, and future. Dallas, needless to say, has not been as fortunate. But what separates these two franchises isn’t an ocean. It’s 58 pounds of hardware. It’s memories of seasons four years ago at most recent, 12 years ago at most distant. The Spurs that were eliminated from the playoffs on Friday weren’t champs at all, but the bare remnants of a team that has, throughout its lifetime, accomplished great things.

Over the years, San Antonio has garnered universal respect through the consistent rebuking of public doubt. Every time a new season or playoff series began, the Spurs had to prove themselves all over again. They were too old. They didn’t have the depth. They were too limited on offense. Some of those points were valid, but over the years that hardly mattered; the Spurs answered their critics with great regular season marks and long playoff runs, even though they were often presumed to be defeated before they even had a chance to compete. As odd as it was, we were all waiting for the day the Spurs would finally fall, and their refusal to abide by the limits of mortal teams only fueled the legend of their excellence.

Only this time, basketball fans have relented. They’ve abandoned the adversarial framework that built up San Antonio’s mythical empire in the first place, and though that concession may benefit the Spurs’ public image, such a shift is of no good to the general discourse.

We know that the Mavs’ 2007 loss to the ‘We Believe’ Warriors is viewed as chokery. Dallas has the unfortunate characterization of being a “regular season team,” as a decade’s worth of work has not resulted in a single championship ring.

I’m also quite certain that had this year’s Lakers — the reigning back-to-back NBA champs, mind you — lost in 6 games to the Hornets in the first round, it would be universally regarded as an embarrassing and derisible failure. They would be considered “soft,” and everyone from Pau Gasol to Kobe Bryant to Phil Jackson would be questioned.

The team that “hasn’t won anything,” was mocked for continuing their ringless trajectory, and the team that has won everything (including those affirming championship rings) would be ripped to pieces for their inability to make it out of the first round. So where, exactly, does that put the Spurs? They’re somehow given the full respect of a champion but without any of the baggage, perhaps the only No. 1 seed in the modern era capable of losing a first-round series with minimal heckling. Many readers and writers of the narrative seem to have things jumbled; highly successful regular season teams are otherwise taunted for the playoff shortcomings regardless of a championship pedigree, yet San Antonio remains untarnished.

To reiterate one final time: as an organization, a team, and a basketball concept, the Spurs deserve respect. I just see no compelling reason why their failures exist on a different plane from those of all other teams, or why the context of this loss is so unique as to be treated with reverence. Sports fans have nothing if not the selective enforcement of their own personal rules, but all I ask for is the slightest bit of logical consistency.

The Science of Zion

Posted by Ian Levy on May 1, 2011 under Commentary, Previews | View Comments

Ian Levy is the author of Hickory High, a contributor to Indy Cornrows, and a part of The Two Man Game family. He’ll be bringing his intelligent brand of — mostly quantitative — analysis here on a weekly basis. You can follow Ian on Twitter at @HickoryHigh.

The first task has been completed. Despite faltering for a few days, the Mavericks were able to regain focus and close out the Trail Blazers on the road in Portland.

In the end, the promise of the Blazers’ versatility fizzled. Only two of the 11 Blazers’ lineups that played more than 5 minutes finished the series with a positive Net Rating. One was The Longs, which never appeared again together after Game 2. The other was the Miller-Roy-Matthews-Wallace-Aldridge configuration. That lineup consistently hurt Dallas, but for some reason only saw 18 minutes of floor time over the course of the entire series.

The Mavericks can now turn their attention to what should be an epic duel with the Los Angeles Lakers. As has been pointed out literally everywhere (even NPR might be in on this one) this is the first playoff meeting between the Lakers and Mavericks since 1988. Two of the decade’s defining players, Dirk Nowitzki and Kobe Bryant, will finally square off when the stakes are the highest.

The Mavericks have tasted playoff success for the first time in years, and confidence will be high after dispatching a solid Trailblazers team in fairly convincing fashion. Still, the Lakers will be favored, as well they should be; L.A. took two out of three from Dallas in the regular season, winning the most recent pair of games by a combined 33 points.

Areas for Concern

At The Point Forward, Zach Lowe highlighted some of the heading into this series. At the top of his list: How does Dallas handle Kobe Bryant? Lowe is right that Kobe creates some problems for the Mavs; the only player in the rotation even remotely equipped to handle Kobe is Shawn Marion, and that matchup is still less than ideal. As Lowe points out, the answer may be finding some minutes for Corey Brewer, a solution which creates another set of problems at the offensive end.

I know this is sacrilege in some circles, but from a Maverick perspective, Kobe should perhaps invoke less fear than Pau Gasol, Andrew Bynum and Lamar Odom. Going back to 2008, the Lakers are 50-23 in the playoffs, for a win percentage of 0.648. Over that same stretch, Kobe has attempted 25 or more shots in a game 23 times. The Lakers are 14-9 in those games, for a win percentage of 0.608. He shot 44.4% from the field and 34.7% on three-pointers in those games — good but not great numbers. The Lakers are at their best, and Kobe at his most efficient, when the offense is balanced. I would be fine with Kobe in hero-mode, taking 35 shots a game. But if the big men are involved, engaged and energetic on offense, opening the floor for Kobe and the rest of the perimeter players, things could get ugly for the Mavericks.

The value of Tyson Chandler on both ends of the floor as has been discussed in some detail in this space, and suffice it to say that Chandler’s defense and rebounding will be crucial to keeping Gasol, Bynum and Odom from running roughshod in the paint. In the regular season, opposing centers averaged 5.6 personal fouls per 48 minutes against the Lakers, as they tried desperately to stymie Gasol and Bynum. Chandler’s average was just 4.1 against the Lakers, a very promising sign. However, his longest streak of 30+ minute games this season was just five. He will probably need to replicate that in this series for the Mavericks to have a chance.

How Dallas shoots from beyond the arc is also going to play a significant role in determining the outcome of this series. The Mavericks made 36.5% of their three-pointers in the regular season, and shot 38.0% in their six games against the Trail Blazers. In their three games against the Lakers they shot just 32.4%. They made 11 of 18 from the corners, but went 11 of 50 from everywhere else behind the three-point line. They don’t need to hit 15 a game , but when left open, DeShawn Stevenson, Peja Stojakavic, Jason Terry and J.J. Barea have to knock down open threes.

Reasons for Optimism

The worst kept secret in the NBA is that the Lakers are vulnerable defensively at the point guard position. The table below shows the individual statistics the Lakers have allowed their opponents, broken down by position.

Lakers' Opponent Production by Position

Point guards score more and more efficiently against the Lakers than any other position. This presents both an opportunity and a challenge for the Mavericks.  Like everyone else, the Mavericks’ point guards were very effective against the Lakers in the regular season. Barea and Kidd posted an eFG% of 60.7% in the three regular season matchups. However, they combined for just 18.4 points per game because they averaged only 14 field goal attempts per contest. The Mavericks point guards are not aggressive scorers by nature, but if they can find some aspect of that assertion deep within themselves, they can take advantage of a rather large hole in the Lakers’ defensive front.

Rodrigue Beaubois played two games against the Lakers this season, and struggled mightily — going 3 of 15 from the field with 2 assists and 2 turnovers in just under 30 minutes of play. Recovering from a sprained foot, Beaubois missed all six games against in the first round, but is nearing a return to game action. He may not be 100%, and Rick Carlisle seems pretty confident with his guard rotation as is, so minutes may be scarce at first. Still, if Beaubois is healthy, he has the potential to create serious problems for L.A.; the Lakers simply can’t defend his speed and athleticism on a one-on-one basis.

Finally, if the Mavericks can keep the games close, they’ll always have a chance to steal one at the end with their crunch-time execution. According to 82games.com, Chandler, Marion and Terry all shoot 50.0% or better from the field in clutch situations. Kidd and Nowitzki shoot a modest 45.8% each in the clutch. Dallas played 27 games this season that were decided by 5 points or less, and won 18 of them (a win percentage of 0.667). Dallas has found ways to pull out close games all season, and while they’d prefer not to rely on their closing ability, but it’s not a bad fall-back plan.