The Down Side of the Bright Side

Posted by Rob Mahoney on March 6, 2010 under Commentary |

First a programming note. Not a lot of regular content this weekend, because I’m currently attending the Sloan Sports Analytics Conference in Boston. I’ll be updating periodically on the deliciously stat-based presentations here, at Hardwood Paroxysm, and on Twitter (@robmahoney), but the blog will probably be light on game-specific content until next week.

I haven’t been shy in singing Brendan Haywood’s praises, particularly since his trade to the Mavs. But as good as Haywood is, and as invaluable he’s been with Erick Dampier sidelined, he’s not without his flaws.

There’s the obvious — the lack of range, not a great ball-handler, certainly not a high-volume scorer — and then there’s the covert. John Huizinga in presenting his paper entitled “The value of a blocked shot in the NBA: From Tim Duncan to Dwight Howard” stumbled upon an interesting piece of such data. According to Huizinga’s analysis, the most valuable blocked shots are — shocker, I know — blocks of non-jumper attempts. If an opposing player is shooting a jump shot, the likelihood of the possession ending in points is significantly lower than, say a layup or a dunk. It seems obvious. But as such, the blocks that make the least impact are blocked jumpers.

A neat stat, to be sure, but even more relevant given the Mavs’ latest man in the middle. Brendan Haywood, according to Huizinga’s data going back to ‘03-’04, has a greater percentage of his total blocks come on jump shots than any other player in the league. Are those blocks still valuable? You’re damn right they are. But does it mean that Haywood’s blocks are on the same level as Tim Duncan’s? Though the natural inclination is to deem it so, a block is not a block.

Duncan was far and away the most effective long-term shot blocker over the course of Huizinga’s study, and while he was trumped easily by Dwight Howard’s incredible shot-blocking volume, Duncan’s overall shot-blocking was more beneficial for his team. In Howard’s case, the downfall was his incredible tendency to goaltend (24% of Dwight’s “block chances” were goaltends. Or put another way, Howard was called for one goaltend for every three blocks). But in Haywood’s, it’s simply totaling most of his blocks on less effective shot attempts. Still beneficial and still effective, but all blocks are not created equal.